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Creating a Culture of Security
in the University of Maryland
Libraries
Charles B. Lowry and Lori A. Goetsch
abstract: Academic institutions must take a greater interest in the security needs of their libraries
and invest management skills, time, and finances proactively in this sphere. Above all, the role of
the library staff must be central to any envisioned program of library security. This article reports
a recent intensive collaborative effort between the University of Maryland Libraries and the
Association of Research Libraries to scrutinize and to revamp security practice and policy of the
University libraries. We believe it was a fruitful association particularly because it made us focus
on the active role of the library staff in fostering and maintaining a spirit of security.
I n mid-October 2000, we had an object lesson that illustrates howmuch building a culture of security is still a work in progress in theUniversity of Maryland Libraries. It was reported on the staff e-mail reflector that a
young male had walked out of the front entrance of the McKeldin Library carrying a
computer monitor. He was
not questioned or otherwise
detained. The incident
occasioned a considerable
amount of discussion on the
staff e-mail reflector. A few
days later the same young
man was stopped carrying the
associated CPU and
questioned by a staff member.
It is a relief to report that he
was a graduate student
cleaning out his carrel and the equipment was his own. Nonetheless, this anecdote
illustrates many of the core problems discussed in this paper and the challenges of
Although the most extreme kind of safety
and security problems are relatively
infrequent in academic libraries, all library
staff need to maintain a keen awareness of
the fact that they are working in a busy
environment that is open to the public
many hours a week.
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developing a safety/security program that establishes continuous and effective practice
among staff in a large research library. But it also illustrates that we are making progress.
Although the most extreme kind of safety and security problems are relatively
infrequent in academic libraries, all library staff need to maintain a keen awareness of
the fact that they are working in a busy environment that is open to the public many
hours a week. Moreover, staff in academic and public libraries are part of a larger
community where thousands of people live, work, and go to school every day. To be
responsible members of this community and to protect our patrons, staff, collections,
and facilities, we must all share responsibility for safety and security. Libraries are
“systems” and security is a vital part of maintaining balance in the system.
Safety and security in libraries include a diverse range of topics, from the seemingly
mundane—such as enforcing no-food/drink policies—to more serious incidents that
include theft and disruptive behavior. Therefore, it is important to provide staff with
the information and the tools to respond to a variety of situations. These include clearly
stated policies that outline what all staff should know and the training to understand
these policies and take action when called upon to do so—what might be called a shared
culture of mutual responsibility for security and safety. Again, to be successful, this
culture must be embraced by all library staff.
Literature Review
As with many other topics in library administration and management, the literature
reflects the profession’s effort to deal practically with the knotty problems of safety and
security. Several handbooks and guides, some developed locally by libraries and shared
with the larger community, provide advice on handling theft and mutilation of library
materials, personal safety, building security, and other related topics.1  Another practical
resource is the Association of Research Libraries SPEC Kit #247, Management of Library
Security, which reports results of a survey of ARL members on safety and security issues.2
The kit includes a checklist of low-cost means of improving security.
A search of the ERIC and Library Literature databases suggests that the journal
literature is also rife with articles on all aspects of library safety and security. The journal
Library and Archival Security has been covering comprehensively security planning,
policies, and practices since 1975. Also, special issues of journals have been devoted to
the subject. For example, Journal of Academic Librarianship published a special issue in
1998 on collection theft, mutilation, and protection,3  and Library Administration and
Management included a special section focusing on personal safety called “Violence in
the Library” in its summer 1997 issue.4  Library Technology Reports focused on technologies
issues related to security and reviewed products in its special issue, “Security Technology
for Libraries.”5  There are numerous other articles similarly focused on the security needs
of libraries.6
In addition to the journal literature, conference proceedings and websites reflect
the profession’s keen interest in library safety and security. The conference To Preserve
and Protect: The Strategic Stewardship of Cultural Resources, a Library of Congress
Bicentennial Symposium in affiliation with the Association of Research Libraries and
the Federal Library and Information Center Committee, was held in fall, 2000. The
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conference offered presentations on electronic information security, materials theft and
mutilation, preservation, collections security planning, and personal safety. An early
version of this paper was presented there.7  A website, “Planning and Building Libraries,”
which describes itself as a resource for “Architects, Librarians, Design Consultants, and
students” includes a link to security information that provides design guidelines and
links to vendors (http://www.slais.ubc.ca/resources/architecture/Security.html).
Despite the wide array of resources available, there is limited information on the
role of staff in library safety and security. When staff is discussed, the focus is useful but
narrow, usually targeting the subject staff training in the management of disruptive
patron behaviors.8  Given the wide variety of problems that staff face, a more
comprehensive approach is needed to create a culture of shared responsibility.
Campus Environment and Library Security
The University of Maryland, College Park, is a Carnegie Research I institution located
in suburban Maryland, “inside the beltway” of the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.
Student enrollment is slightly over 33,000 with more than 11,000 university faculty and
staff rounding out the campus population. Despite its big city surroundings, the campus
spans 1,500 acres and has the look and feel of a large residential university. Campus
safety and security issues mirror those of similar institutions with burglary topping the
list, followed by motor vehicle theft, assault, and sex offenses.9  Campus safety and
security is provided by the University of Maryland Police Department (UMPD), whose
approximately seventy-five officers have all the powers of any peace or police officer in
the State. UMPD also shares jurisdiction in some areas with the Prince Georges County
Police Department Staff.
The safety and security environment in the University Libraries prior to 1997 relied
heavily on services provided by UMPD. The Libraries contracted with UMPD to recruit,
train and manage Student Police Aides (SPAs), part of the Police Auxiliary unit.
Frequently undergraduates, the SPAs were posted at the entrance of the two largest
library buildings, McKeldin (at that time the graduate library) and Hornbake (at that
time the undergraduate library). SPAs also staffed a security point in the “24 hour room”
on the ground floor of Hornbake. Their principal duties were to monitor the 3MTM exit
gates and enforce the “no food, no drink” policy. On an hourly basis SPAs also did
rounds through the building looking for food, drink, and disruptive behavior. No
provisions were made for SPAs at the four smaller branch libraries on campus except at
closing when SPAs were asked to sweep the branch libraries and to ensure that all
patrons had vacated the facilities. Otherwise, staff in the branches carried the full
responsibilities and this created a significant inconsistency in security practice.
In September 1997, the UMPD indicated that it wished to terminate the library SPA
contract. It was difficult for them to recruit, select, train, and retain an adequate number
of SPAs to meet the contract and they were experiencing the criticism that naturally
resulted from any shortcomings in the service. Complaints about SPA services were
many—among them not showing up for duty on time, not enforcing the food/drink
policy, and sleeping on the job. It is clear in retrospect from the dearth of “incident
reports” that the SPA system did not really provide security, only the illusion of it.
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Security Audit/Timeline and Process
The UMPD’s interest in discontinuing the library’s SPA contract and new leadership in
the library (Dean of Libraries arrived fall 1996; Director of Public Services fall 1997)
provided the occasion to review the SPA practice. Philosophically, we agreed that staff
should assume principal responsibility for safety and security of library users, collections,
and facilities. Indeed, we have more than once observed the irony of having
undergraduates deal with sensitive and often difficult matters while full-time staff were
outside observers. Although staff members could be critical of an incompetent SPA,
they were unwilling to take responsibility themselves. Pragmatically, we also were
interested in reallocating the $160,000 annual budget that went into the SPA contract for
other staff needs. As chance would have it, the Association of Research Libraries was
seeking to pilot a security self-study with a nearby member of the association, and
Maryland was approached. Since the ARL proposal would give us an opportunity to
make a “top-to-bottom” review of our safety/security capabilities and to explore
alternatives, we were eager to participate.
A critical part of building such a staff-wide culture of responsibility is a thorough
understanding of all the elements of a library’s security environment. To address the
need for a more coherent approach to
library safety and security that reinforces
a philosophy of shared responsibility
among all staff, the University of
Maryland Libraries embarked on an
assessment of policies, procedures, and
facilities in partnership with the
Association of Research Libraries (ARL).
Begun in the fall of 1997, the security
study and subsequent development of
practice and policy were implemented over a two-year period and now serve as a model
comprehensive approach for a large academic library system.
After some negotiation, the ARL project commenced in October 1997 with a meeting
among the Library Executive Council (senior managers reporting to the Dean), Glenn
Zimmerman from ARL, and Robert Morse, a representative from George P. Morse and
Associates, a local loss prevention firm hired to consult on the project. The plan was to
have Morse conduct a comprehensive audit of the UM Libraries’ safety/security
environment as a foundation for developing the self-study materials that might be used
in other libraries. The audit would be both a management study—focusing on
philosophy, policies, procedures—and an assessment of current facilities and practices
with recommendations for corrective action as needed. Morse presented the libraries a
project proposal in November with an anticipated completion date of April 1998. The
Director of Public Services and Director of Planning and Administrative Services were
designated as the in-house contacts for the audit. Throughout the project we remained
in regular communication with ARL.
The importance of the audit was emphasized when, shortly after we began, the
UMPD informed us that there would be a dramatic increase in charges for SPA services
once our contract expired at the end of the year. Rates were to increase from $8/hour to
A critical part of building such a
staff-wide culture of responsibility
is a thorough understanding of all
the elements of a library’s security
environment.
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$15. It was clear that the Libraries budget could not sustain a nearly twofold increase in
so large a line item in the budget. In anticipation of that change, and in recognition that
the audit and its recommendations would not be available until spring, Hornbake Library
security was turned over to the Hornbake circulation staff. We continued to use the
services of the SPAs at a negotiated slightly lower rate in McKeldin Library with the
proviso that we would terminate the contract if the recommendations of the audit pointed
in a new direction.
A detailed description of the Morse and Associates methodology is not necessary
here. They conducted numerous site visits and interviews during the winter and early
spring, including meetings with UMPD, Physical Plant, Campus Security, security-
related vendors such as 3MTM, and numerous library staff. These meetings were intensive
in-depth considerations of the current environment. In addition, a thorough investigation
of six library facilities was conducted. In June of 1998 a draft report was presented and
discussed with the Library Executive Council (LEC) and revisions and clarifications
were suggested. The final report was accepted by LEC in November 1998. This was six
months later than we anticipated, which reflects the complexity of the library security
environment and the demands we made on Morse and Associates to make the work as
comprehensive and comprehensible as possible. Above all, we wanted recommendations
that could be implemented effectively.
Morse Report Recommendations
The Morse Report is a 100-page analysis based on interviews, documents, and direct
observation. We are still using it more than three years later. Existing conditions were
examined for risks and hazards, and current safety and security capabilities were
assessed. The resulting report makes numerous and detailed recommendations for action
to improve security—from quite detailed technology recommendations to those directed
at general policy and practice. The recommendations may be summarized as follows:
• The UM Libraries have no single authority for safety/security matters. It is vital
that a locus of responsibility and authority for practice be established at the level
of Director reporting to the Dean.
• There is a wide divergence in employee attitudes toward safety and security,
“ranging from substantial involvement to disinterest and apathy.” The Libraries
must develop an articulated philosophy along with policies and procedures,
followed by a training program for all staff.
• An emergency response team should be formed.
• Hard data must be collected through inventories to accurately assess collection
loss.
• Effective access control systems and other safety/security technologies such as
video cameras need to be improved for all library facilities. In this regard, several
levels of technology implementation were described, but the recommendation
was that at least Level I should be achieved early on.
• Use of student police aides should be discontinued, and staff should assume full
responsibility for safety and security in the UM Libraries in close cooperation
with the UMPD.
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This last recommendation was the most far-reaching because it pointed in a direction
that was dramatically different from current practice. The report stated matters quite
forcefully:
The Security history of the Libraries indicates that a full-time police presence is not
required, but that rapid police response must be virtually certain. The current SPA staff
has no greater authority, training, or capabilities than should be provided to similar
library staff. There is no reason to expect that security conditions will deteriorate. . . .
The assignment of the Protection function to Library staff requires that very specific
responsibilities, duties and training requirements be developed and utilized. Library
personnel must be instructed regarding their responsibility to monitor their areas of
responsibility and, particularly, in actions to be taken in the event of an incident.
Once the Morse Report was submitted, the libraries began to implement the
recommendations, particularly those that did not require financial resources. Key
recommendations included the development of a procedures manual. Work was begun,
using the former SPA manual, various library policies and procedures, and the security
audit as a foundation. New “University of Maryland Libraries Safety/Security
Guidelines” were prepared in late 1998 and may be viewed on the Libraries’ website.10  At
the same time, the Libraries discontinued the services of the SPAs and security for McKeldin
and opening/closing of all library facilities became the responsibility of library staff. In
McKeldin, the circulation and information services staff bore the brunt of these changes.
To assist in the transition, UMPD provided training in food and drink enforcement,
managing the exit gates, coping with disruptive patrons, opening and closing procedures,
and medical and facilities emergencies. This training, along with the procedures manual,
served as the foundation for a library-wide training effort that was also planned during
the fall and implemented in the early months of 1999. Nearly 250 staff have participated
in training that addressed the following objectives:
• Staff will understand security procedures and be able to implement them.
• Staff will be able to use techniques for dealing with problem customer situations
(e.g., communication skills, conflict resolution).
Training sessions began with the discussion of a “Richter scale” instrument that assesses
staff perceptions of the environment in which they work and their comfort level with
handling uncomfortable situations. Following discussion and application of the scale,
participants received a detailed orientation to the safety/security guidelines. The session
ended with role-plays of various situations described in the guidelines.
In addition to the development of the manual and the training program, we began
to examine the many recommendations in the Morse Report for improving security of
our facilities and collections. As time passed we allocated more fiscal resources to the
effort. 3MTM was brought in to evaluate our security gates and to present a proposal for
their replacement. Funding was sought through the university’s enhancement fund
process, and gates in all facilities were replaced in early 2000 at a cost of over $82,000.
Because of the closing of undergraduate library services in Hornbake Library, McKeldin
Library opened for 24 hour / 5 days a week access in the fall of 1999. This change gave
us the opportunity to upgrade some video camera systems and provide card access
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readers to the building so that only members of the campus community with appropriate
IDs have late-night access. The cost for the initial equipment installation was $22,000;
an additional $54,000 has recently been quoted to expand and upgrade the video camera
system in McKeldin Library. In addition, the University provided $45,000 in new ongoing
funding to support the personnel needs for this service access. In summary, by the end
of fiscal year 2000 (July), we had spent $104,000 in one-time physical improvements
and added $45,000 to the budget for personnel. In addition, we have reallocated $160,000
in personnel costs that formerly were devoted to funding SPAs. Most of this was absorbed
by two rounds of increases in the Federal minimum wage paid from our “labor and
assistance” budget to student employees. We plan additional equipment expenditures
of more than $50,000 for FY 2001 and 2002.
Once the initial staff training was completed and the manual was distributed to all
staff, responsibilities for safety/security were transferred from the Public Services
Division to the Planning and Administrative Services Division. PASD includes the Staff
Training and Development Office, which has assumed responsibility for continued
safety/security training. Conflict resolution training was offered in summer 2000 as
part of this effort. A Safety/Security Committee—the “emergency response team” called
for by the Morse Report recommendations—was also formed and charged to monitor
and improve the safety/security environment in the library, to recommend training,
and continually to update the procedures manual. In addition, floor-marshals were
identified and trained to assist in building emergencies such as fire. This group went
through training that included the campus fire marshal and has subsequently
coordinated practice fire drills. In the summer of 1999 the Safety and Security Committee
membership was appointed. Within a year the Floor Marshals had been incorporated
formally into the Committee’s operations to ensure effective management of emergency
response. It is worth mentioning that they work closely with the Libraries’ Disaster
Team, which has the primary function of responding to crises that threaten collections.
The Disaster Team has had to act in at least four major water-related crises during past
few years, but that is another story.
We also wanted to educate our users better and to involve them in safety/security
practice. In the spring of 2000 a Library Conduct Working Group was charged to review
our food/drink policy and make
recommendations for improving com-
munications with our users about their role
as partners in the stewardship of library
collections and facilities. The group
recently has submitted its report to the
Library Executive Council. These recommendations were informed by contact with the
University’s student disciplinary system to ensure that our policy and practice reflected
the campus practice.
While much activity has taken place, one of the original goals for participating in
the audit—to encourage staff involvement in and responsibility for safety and security—
has remained a challenge. It is much easier to write procedures and to improve equipment
than it is to change an organizational culture! Throughout the course of the past three
years, some staff continue to question their role and ability to handle safety and security
We also wanted to educate our
users better and to involve them
in safety/security practice.
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responsibilities. Indeed, as recently as spring 2001, in a meeting of the Safety/Security
Committee, it was suggested that we create a security force within the Libraries to assume
responsibility for these duties rather than to expect staff to undertake them. This note of
dissent in the very group most responsible for safety indicates how deeply resistant the
staff psyche is to those duties. In Reframing Organizations, Bolman and Deal point to
four major forces that inhibit organizational change. All proceed from groups and
individuals—loss of individual ability to feel effective and in control; disruption of
existing roles and relationships; conflict among “winners and losers;” and perceived
loss of “meaning” for individuals.11  At the same time the solution is pretty obvious.
It sounds simplistic to point out that investments in change call for collateral investments
in training. Yet countless reform initiatives falter and fail because managers neglect to
spend time and money on developing necessary knowledge and skills.12
We have made some progress in this regard, but it is clear that the training dimension of
the problem is far from solved. Equally important, staff are engaged with the decision-
making process and may influence implementation.
As they become more practiced and accustomed to dealing with these problems,
many staff have welcomed the authority to act. Others, however, are still inclined to
turn a blind eye to a soft drink bottle coming in the front door or to a gate alarm sounding.
The anecdote at the beginning of this paper is strong indication of how long it takes to
imbue and organization with the spirit of shared responsibility in such matters. Through
continued orientation and training, as well as constant vigilance to improve to our
facilities and security capabilities, we remain confident that we can achieve the goal of
broadly shared responsibility for safety. Although we have had what might be called
“basic training,” the Training Office has only recently developed a training workshop that
will be repeated at regular intervals. With the assistance of the UMPD, the first monthly
training sessions were offered in December 2000 and January 2001. Their goals are:
• To promote safety and security procedures in the UM Libraries
• To improve awareness of safety and security issues in the UM Libraries and on
campus
• To improve interpersonal skills in order to reduce the risk associated with difficult
situations/patrons within the library system
• To foster the relationship between the UMPD and library staff
• To set guidelines for conduct with regard to safety and security
• To supplement the safety and security provided to each staff member
After completing the training session with the UMPD, the Libraries’ staff are able
to meet ten behavioral objectives that assure the baseline skills for participation in the
Libraries’ safety and security program. They are able to:
• List the steps to identify problem situations/patrons as defined by UMPD
• State strategies that can be instituted within individual departments that would
facilitate safety and security
• Demonstrate proper vigilance and promote sharing of information with co-
workers with regard to safety and security
• Demonstrate constructive dialog that promotes conflict resolution through case
studies practice sessions
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• Recognize members of the UMPD
• Recognize and follow appropriate safety guidelines as provided by the UMPD
• Identify and record important safety information as outlined by the safety and
security manual
• Understand and practice personal safety
• Set limits for enforcing library policy including knowledge of when to ask for
additional staff or assistance
• State where emergency phones, exits and fire extinguishers are located within
the normal working area
We are also exploring ways to test staff attitudes such as focus groups and surveys. We
hope these will yield information that will be an additional guide to staff training needs.
We have addressed many of the Morse Report’s larger recommendations save one,
but there are still small items that need attention, particularly technology applications
such as video cameras in branches, “panic” buttons, and cell phones. The major lacuna
is the lack of collection inventories. This is a result of the fact that we have just completed
the last phase of the procurement of a new library system, one with inventory capabilities
that we do not have now. We selected Ex Libris in late October 2000. A collection inventory
can now be planned. One of the original purposes of the Morse Report—to serve as a
prototype and foundation for an ARL self-study activity—has not been possible because
of the lack of funding. ARL remains committed to developing a generally applicable
program and will seek the funding and/or partnerships with libraries to do so. We
welcome the opportunity to continue to work with ARL because we recognize the value
of this experience for our libraries.
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